COMMENTS
FINDING VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY IN OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTELLATION
Maura Douglas*
INTRODUCTION
Viewpoint-based regulations have long been regarded as the most
contemptuous, democracy-threatening restrictions on speech: “censorship in
its purest form”1 that attempts to suppress disfavored or supposedly
dangerous ideas.2 Indeed, the promotion of diverse thought and the
constitutionally protected right to speak freely separates the United States
from totalitarian regimes.3 Justice Jackson stated in an oft-quoted passage in
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette4: “If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official . . . can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”5 Yet as the Court
has retracted6 and expanded its recognition of maintaining so-called
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Executive Editor, Volume 166, University of Pennsylvania Law Review. J.D. Candidate, 2018,
University of Pennsylvania Law School; M.S.E., 2013, B.A., 2011, University of Pennsylvania. My
immense gratitude to Professor Seth Kreimer for comments and suggestions in the development of
this Comment, and for his consistent guidance and mentorship. Thanks are due to the editors of
the Journal of Constitutional Law, particularly Articles Editor Carolyn Jackson and Executive Editor
Jonathan Gilman. All errors are my own.
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 102–04 (1996)
(“[G]overnment discrimination against broad categories of expression such as ‘political,’
‘controversial,’ or ‘offensive’ speech, is often a guise for disagreement with the ideas expressed, or
is so close in spirit to viewpoint discrimination . . . .”).
See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“The right to speak freely and to promote
diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from
totalitarian regimes.”).
319 U.S. 624 (1943); see also id. at 644 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring) (“These laws must, to be
consistent with the First Amendment, permit the widest toleration of conflicting viewpoints
consistent with a society of free men.”).
Id. at 642.
The viewpoint neutrality principle was curtailed temporarily during McCarthyism. See Nicole B.
Cásarez, Public Forums, Selective Subsidies, and Shifting Standards of Viewpoint Discrimination, 64 ALB. L.
REV. 501, 508 (2000) (discussing how the Court in the 1950s merely paid “lip service” to the idea
that contrarian views had a right to be expressed).
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viewpoint neutrality at all costs, it has simultaneously left open opportunities
for viewpoint discrimination to be permissible, without necessarily providing
for a logical roadmap to analyze it in every context.
The Court has not provided consistency in its determinations of
viewpoint neutrality (or conversely, viewpoint discrimination) in state action.
Given that viewpoint-based regulations are an “egregious form” of content
discrimination, the Court applies some version of strict scrutiny. But, even
that determination seems to stand on shaky ground because such scrutiny is
rarely applied to viewpoint-based regulations. Instead, the Court may
determine that viewpoint discrimination exists, state that strict scrutiny
applies, and—without conducting further analysis—find the state action
unconstitutional. It has become a sort of prophetic realization before the
prophecy is actually realized.7 Then-professor Elena Kagan noted in 1996
that the Court “almost always rigorously reviews [to find if viewpoint
discrimination exists] and then invalidates regulations based on viewpoint”
rather than explicitly apply strict scrutiny as it would to other content-based
restrictions.8 Other legal scholars have even argued that “[t]here can be no
exceptions to the constitutional bar of viewpoint-based regulations.”9 The
Court itself has stated that determining a law is content-based and viewpointdiscriminatory is “all but dispositive.”10 However, most federal courts still
recognize that there is “impermissible viewpoint discrimination,” which
implies there are certain viewpoint-based regulations on speech that are
permissible.11 And emphatic statements such as “the absolute First
Amendment heavy presumption against viewpoint discrimination”12 are
oxymoronic in their resoluteness: how can a presumption be absolute?
If viewpoint discrimination is fundamentally unconstitutional, then there
need be no further scrutiny of a viewpoint-based regulation, because it would
per se be impermissible. If, on the other hand, viewpoint-based restrictions
are not per se unconstitutional, and are subject to strict scrutiny, then there
would be no need for the Court to functionally distinguish between contentbased and viewpoint-based regulations. Now, this is an oversimplification of
7
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See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 4, sc. 1 (prophesying how Macbeth would die when
“Great Birnam wood to high Dunsinane Hill Shall come against him;” he resigned himself to such
fate when he realized it was happening).
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 444 (1996).
Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint
Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 109 (2007) (emphasis added); see also RODNEY A. SMOLLA,
1 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4:8 (2017) (citing late twentieth-century federal
court case law to find that “[m]odern First Amendment cases establish a per se rule making the
punishment of speech flatly unconstitutional if the penalty is based on the offensiveness or the
undesirability of the viewpoint expressed.”).
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011) (citation omitted).
See infra Subpart II.B.
SMOLLA, supra note 9, § 11:26.
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the tension, and is flawed when a First Amendment analysis is complicated
by such considerations as the type of forum and speech to which the
regulation applies.13 And this is murky terrain even for just content
discrimination, since some members of the Court feel strict scrutiny should
not automatically apply to all content-based regulations.14 It is likely, then,
that the implicit legal analysis of viewpoint-discrimination claims falls
somewhere in the middle: the strict scrutiny applied to viewpoint-based
regulations is more strict (practically fatal) than other types of content
discrimination, but no absolute bar exists, perhaps in part to provide
breathing room for future decisions.
This Comment considers this puzzle in more detail by examining both
recent decisions of the Supreme Court as well as those of the federal courts
of appeals that wrestle with these questions: whether a statute is viewpointneutral, and when, if ever, a federal court will uphold a restriction whilst
simultaneously determining it is viewpoint-based. Part I provides a broad
legal definition of viewpoint neutrality, as distinguished from content
neutrality. Part II begins an account of when the Court has invalidated
viewpoint-based regulations, as well as the circumstances in which it has
upheld them.15 Part III reviews decisions made by the federal courts of
appeals from 2014 to 2017 involving viewpoint-discrimination challenges to
state action. Specifically, Subpart III.A addresses the impact of shifting
outside of the forum analysis, focusing in greater detail on the impact of
Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.16 Subpart III.B looks
at how heightened discretion in limited public forums and nonpublic forums
may lead to premature findings of viewpoint neutrality, and how this could
lead to increased viewpoint discrimination. Finally, Part IV addresses the
most recent Supreme Court determination of viewpoint discrimination in
Matal v. Tam,17 and its implications for how federal courts may analyze
impermissible viewpoint discrimination claims in the future.
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See infra Part II. Laws can be constitutionally content-based but viewpoint-neutral in a limited
public forum or nonpublic forum under intermediate scrutiny, or in a public forum under strict
scrutiny.
See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“In my
view, the category ‘content discrimination’ is better considered in many contexts, including here,
as a rule of thumb, rather than as an automatic ‘strict scrutiny’ trigger, leading to almost certain
legal condemnation.”); id. at 2238 (Kagan, J., concurring) (noting that if a statute does not
realistically suppress certain ideas, then “we may do well to relax our guard so that ‘entirely
reasonable’ laws imperiled by strict scrutiny can survive.”).
This is meant to provide a general overview and identify broad trends in these categories involving
the pursuit of identifying and analyzing viewpoint neutrality. This is by no means an allencompassing survey of the case law and secondary research already completed on this topic. It is
intended to set the backdrop for recent circuit decisions.
135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
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I. BASIC CONTOURS OF VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY
According to well-settled First Amendment principle, the Constitution
does not authorize the “official suppression of ideas.”18 A viewpoint-based
restriction does just that; namely, it aims to suppress a particular view that
may be considered dangerous (to the government).19 More specifically, the
Court defines viewpoint discrimination as a regulation of speech, the rationale
for which is the “specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of
the speaker.”20 Justice Brennan referred to viewpoint discrimination as pure
censorship and a fierce threat to the “continued vitality” of freedom of
expression.21 Because of its association with muzzling speech due to the
particular idea expressed, inapposite to the First Amendment, viewpoint
discrimination is presumed impermissible in almost every context.
Given its key role in free speech doctrine as a means to effectively
facilitate the free marketplace of ideas, viewpoint neutrality can “preserve the
reality of free expression” in a society diverse with beliefs, thoughts, and
experiences.22 Of course, this core principle of American legal jurisprudence
cuts against the concurrent reality that free expression leaves the public space
open for “thought that we hate.”23 In Cohen v. California, Justice Harlan struck
down a law criminalizing offensive conduct that was “maliciously and
willfully disturb[ing] the peace” as applied to wearing a jacket that said “Fuck
the Draft.”24 Harlan emphasized that speech did not need to meet social
standards of acceptability, so long as communicated peacefully, and that
“[t]he constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society
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Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2237 (citation omitted); see also N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725
(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he First Amendment stands as an absolute bar to the
imposition of judicial restraints [to block the publication of material sought to be suppressed by the
Government] . . . .”). See generally United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
See Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950) (“Under some circumstances, indirect
‘discouragements’ undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment
rights as imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes.”); see also Heins, supra note 2, at 106–10.
Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (citation omitted).
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Seth F. Kreimer, Good Enough for Government Work: Two Cheers for Content Neutrality, 16 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1261, 1276 (2014) (“The core question for first amendment doctrine should be neither whether
every application preserves the essence of democratic discourse . . . nor whether all ‘common sense’
or ‘proportionate’ regulations survive its strictures. Rather, attention should focus on the extent to
which the doctrine contributes to a system of norms which preserve the reality of free expression in
American society.”). Professor Redish argues viewpoint discrimination is “the most universally
condemned threat to the foundations of free expression.” Redish, supra note 9, at 69.
Kreimer, supra note 22, at 1330 n.173 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971). The Court specifically distinguished the expression
used by Cohen from other cases involving fighting words because the speech was not directed at
anyone. Accord Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 258–59 (1951) (upholding a state statute that
criminalized the exhibit of any play or sketch portraying a class of citizens in a significantly negative
light, reasoning that the state should have power to punish libel “directed at a defined group”).
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as diverse and populous as [this].”25 While the Court never used the phrase
“viewpoint neutrality,” the thrust of its importance is evident in Cohen and in
earlier precedent.26 It “is the function of speech to free men from the
bondage of irrational fears,”27 and state-sanctioned suppression of differences
in viewpoints can lead to suspicion, willful ignorance, and even hatred.
A. Distinguishing Content-Based and Viewpoint-Based Regulations
Viewpoint discrimination is a form of content discrimination, and the
Court in recent years frequently has used “content” and “viewpoint”
interchangeably.28 But despite this conflation, the terms encompass distinct
meanings. Content discrimination exists if the government restricts
discussion of an entire topic; content and viewpoint discrimination exist if the
government restricts specific points of view on that topic. Further, an
otherwise viewpoint-neutral, content-based regulation may still be
viewpoint-discriminatory if applied in a manner that discriminates against a
particular view. Elena Kagan illustrated this “hazier” distinction within
content-based regulations with the following example:
[T]he Court would treat differently a law prohibiting the use of billboards
for all political advertisements and a law prohibiting the use of billboards for
political advertisements supporting Democrats. The former might meet
constitutional standards; the latter would never succeed in doing so. It is not
so much that the Court formally uses two different standards for subject
matter and viewpoint regulation; in most contexts, a strict scrutiny standard
applies to content-based action of all kinds. But the Court, when reviewing
subject-matter restrictions, either may apply a purportedly strict standard
less than strictly or may disdain to recognize the law as content based at all.29

Kagan’s example identifies the distinction between “viewpoint” and
“content”—albeit with a stark example not before the Court—and
underscores interpretive challenges of applying this doctrine, triggering the
same level of scrutiny for different types of regulations (or different standards
of scrutiny to the same type of regulation).30 Ultimately, all content-based
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Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring).
Justice Thomas pointed out this confusion in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2229–30 (2015),
faulting the Ninth Circuit with assuming the town code at issue was content-neutral because it did
not discriminate based on viewpoint. Justice Brennan also reasoned that the “content neutrality
principle” grew out of the core prohibition against viewpoint discrimination. Perry Educ. Ass’n v.
Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 59 (1983).
Kagan, supra note 8, at 444. Kagan’s use of “subject matter” rather than content may not survive
following Thomas’ example in Reed. While the Court in Reed invalidated a content-based,
viewpoint-neutral regulation, there was not unanimous agreement that the regulation was not
viewpoint-discriminatory. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2239 (Kagan, J., concurring).
For an example of how a lower court may struggle to either interpret the Supreme Court’s analysis
or ignore it altogether, see infra Part III.

732

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20:3

and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech are currently subject to strict
scrutiny in public fora and presumptively invalid, except in a narrow set of
cases discussed later in this Comment.31
Reed v. Town of Gilbert provides a recent illustration of deciphering whether
a content-based regulation is also viewpoint-based.32 In Reed, the Court
unanimously found a town ordinance that differentiated between temporary
messages and political or ideological messages on public signs facially
unconstitutional, and an impermissible content-based regulation on
speech.33 Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, noted that the sign code
was content-based even though it did not discriminate against certain
viewpoints.34 He used the following analogy, similar to that of Kagan, to
distinguish the two kinds of regulations:
[A] speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content
based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints . . . . For
example, a law banning the use of sound trucks for political speech—
and only political speech—would be a content-based regulation, even
if it imposed no limits on the political viewpoints that could be
expressed. The Town’s Sign Code likewise singles out specific subject
matter for differential treatment, even if it does not target viewpoints
within that subject matter. Ideological messages are given more
favorable treatment than [political] messages[,] . . . which are
themselves given more favorable treatment than messages
announcing an assembly of like-minded individuals.35
Even though the statute was viewpoint-neutral, it was content-based, as
Thomas points out, and could not survive strict scrutiny.36 A restriction on
free speech can therefore be bucketed into three categories relevant to a
viewpoint-neutrality inquiry: content-neutral, and thus viewpoint-neutral;
content-based but viewpoint-neutral; and content-based and viewpointbased.37 However, Justices frequently disagree both about whether
viewpoint discrimination exists, and also the extent to which it is permissible,
which has provoked confusion and discord across the federal bench.
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See infra Subpart II.B; see also United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (listing the
categories of speech where content-based restrictions have traditionally been permitted: advocacy
intended to incite imminent lawless action, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal
conduct, fraud, fighting words, child pornography, true threats, and speech “presenting some grave
and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent”).
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2229–30.
Id. at 2232.
Id. at 2230–31.
Id. at 2230.
Id. at 2228–30.
EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 361 (5th ed. 2014).
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B. Content-Based, Viewpoint-Neutral Regulations
Considering the Court’s analysis of content-based regulations illustrates
in part why federal courts have struggled to apply First Amendment law
uniformly when it comes to content-based regulations that implicate
questions of viewpoint discrimination.38 This Subpart is intended to provide
a broad sense of where the Court has situated itself in the past two decades
on when a statute is viewpoint-neutral, but content-based, when it is not, and
when such regulations can be constitutional.39 It may appear straightforward
on its face to determine what is a “viewpoint” or “discrimination,” but the
Court has been far from clear on that front, which raises concerns for lower
courts as well as litigants and policymakers.
Even if a content-based regulation on protected speech in a public or
designated public forum is considered viewpoint-neutral, it is still subject to
strict scrutiny.40 In a public forum, for example, the government cannot
selectively restrict expression due to its ideas, message or content, but can
enforce reasonable time, place or manner restrictions that are narrowly
tailored to the stated interest, justified without reference to content.41 While
individual expression cannot be restricted solely due to the views expressed,
that right must be met by the reality that people cannot “publicize their views
‘whenever and however and wherever they please.’”42
Frequently, any analysis of viewpoint neutrality will be foregone if a
challenged regulation would fail under a less demanding test, regardless of
whether it is viewpoint-based or not.43 Thus, if the Court can argue that a
regulation is unconstitutional because it is content-based, without determining
38
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See, e.g., Morgan v. Swanson, 755 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2014) (contending the assertion that
“viewpoint discrimination regarding private speech is unconstitutional” is generally true, but that
the “nearly universal prohibition against viewpoint discrimination does not inform an official as to
what, precisely, constitutes viewpoint discrimination”).
See Cásarez, supra note 6, at 505 (“To understand and apply the prohibition against viewpoint
discrimination, the Supreme Court has had to address two linked and overlapping
questions. . . . [W]hat qualifies as a ‘viewpoint,’ and . . . what constitutes ‘discrimination.’
Although these questions appear simplistic, the Court has provided differing answers in various
contexts, resulting in uncertainty about the meaning of viewpoint discrimination across the board.”)
See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text.
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529, 2548–49 (2014) (striking down a statute criminalizing
standing on public sidewalks within thirty-five feet of abortion clinics in a First Amendment
challenge because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest).
Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2066, 2070 (2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
(reversing a Ninth Circuit determination of clearly established viewpoint discrimination by Secret
Service agents controlling protests where the President was dining).
See, e.g., McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2542 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court found it unnecessary to
‘parse the differences between . . . two [available] standards’ where a statute challenged on First
Amendment grounds ‘fail[s] even under the [less demanding] test.’” (alterations in original) (quoting
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1446 (2014) (plurality opinion)));
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1307 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Even if the restrictions
on speech can be seen as viewpoint neutral—a point we need not address—that does not mean that
they are content-neutral.”).
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whether it discriminates by viewpoint, the Court will almost always avoid any
discussion of viewpoint discrimination. This creates challenges for lower courts
who struggle to decipher whether a regulation is viewpoint-discriminatory, or
just impermissibly content-based, under current doctrine.
An illustration of this unconstitutional, content-based, but viewpointneutral trichotomy, and the tension within each layer, may be found in
McCullen v. Coakley.44 In McCullen, every member of the Court believed a state
statute that established a buffer zone on public sidewalks at abortion clinics
was unconstitutional, but for different reasons.45 Justice Roberts, writing the
majority opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, argued that the statute was content-neutral because it did not make
facially content-based distinctions, but that it did not survive a lesser, albeit
heightened scrutiny.46 In contrast, Justice Scalia concurred, writing for
Justices Kennedy and Thomas, and argued the statute was both content- and
viewpoint-based, such that strict scrutiny was triggered (which the regulation
could not survive).47 While Justice Scalia did not end the analysis at his
determination there was viewpoint discrimination—going on to say strict
scrutiny applied—the Court has never upheld a viewpoint-based regulation
of protected speech in a traditional public forum.
The Justices on the Court do not always agree that strict scrutiny should
apply to content-based regulations in public forums, however. In Reed, while
the Court unanimously invalidated a content-based, viewpoint-neutral town
ordinance, the Justices diverged on the uniform application of strict scrutiny
for content-based regulations. In her concurrence, joined by Justices Breyer
and Ginsburg, Justice Kagan argued that strict scrutiny should not apply to
all content-based regulations like the one at issue.48 In her view, strict
scrutiny should apply only where there is a real danger that “official
suppression of ideas is afoot.”49 Justice Breyer, writing a separate
concurrence, similarly argued that content discrimination should not always
trigger strict scrutiny; otherwise, the judiciary will be interfering with and
managing ordinary government activity because nearly all government
activity involves speech.50 Effectively, Breyer pushed for strict scrutiny to
apply to content-based regulations in traditional public forums or that
discriminate by viewpoint, but not for all cases of content discrimination. He
argued that content discrimination should not always be a “determinative

44
45
46
47
48
49
50

134 S. Ct. at 2534, 2547, 2549.
Id.
Id. at 2532.
Id. at 2547 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[S]o long as the statute permits speech favorable to abortion
rights while excluding antiabortion speech, it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint.”).
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2238 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring).
Id. at 2237 (Kagan, J., concurring).
Id. at 2234–35 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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legal tool[ ] in an appropriate case,” instead acting as a “supplement to a
more basic analysis” of a regulation.51 Thus, even though it may seem settled
that content-based regulations in traditional or designated public forums are
subject to strict scrutiny, an undercurrent of alternative reasoning at work
could perhaps alter this normative principle.
Two forums where strict scrutiny does not apply per se to content-based
regulations are limited public forums and nonpublic forums.52 A traditional
public forum is designated as such primarily because its principal purpose is
the exchange of ideas.53 Conversely, speech restrictions in a limited public or
nonpublic forum are subject to fewer First Amendment constraints.54 In either
forum, a content-based regulation must still be both reasonable and viewpointneutral.55 But that viewpoint neutrality is required for restricting speech in a
forum subject to lesser scrutiny, calls into question whether viewpoint-based
regulations on protected speech could ever survive a forum analysis.56 The
Court has provided little direction as to whether a viewpoint-based, but
reasonable regulation in a nonpublic forum would be invalidated because it is
not viewpoint-neutral, or because it does not then survive strict scrutiny.

51
52
53
54

55
56

Id.
While the Court refers to these differently, they seem to be interchangeable and require the same
analysis.
See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (finding traditional public forums are
“venues for the exchange of ideas”).
See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998) (upholding a public
broadcaster’s right to exclude a politically nonviable candidate from a televised debate); see also
Frederick Schauer, Comment, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84,
88–89 (1998) (stating that even though the Court in Forbes found the debate to be a nonpublic
forum, the majority made the argument that public broadcasting was normally authorized to make
viewpoint-based decisions because it was not a forum, subject to certain exceptions like debates).
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
The Supreme Court has not made clear whether failing on the viewpoint-neutral prong of a limited
public forum analysis would trigger strict scrutiny or invalidate the regulation. See, e.g., Good News
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001) (noting that a speech restriction in a limited
public forum “must not discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint” (emphasis added)).
The majority of the circuit opinions read as if viewpoint neutrality is a necessary element to any
restriction in a limited public forum, not just a potential trigger for more heightened scrutiny. See,
e.g., Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2017) (“It is beyond debate that the law
prohibits viewpoint discrimination in a limited public forum.”); NAACP v. City of Philadelphia,
834 F.3d 435, 449 n.7 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Apart from reasonableness, a second requirement that exists
no matter how we label the forum is viewpoint neutrality.”); Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1170
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (“A law that discriminated on the basis of viewpoint [to shield criticism] would
plainly infringe the First Amendment even in a nonpublic forum.”); Seattle Mideast Awareness
Campaign v. King Cty., 781 F.3d 489, 502 (9th Cir. 2015) (“In a limited public forum, . . . what’s
forbidden is viewpoint discrimination, not content discrimination.”).
Further, finding a regulation within a limited public forum is unreasonable (the other
requirement) would deem the statute unconstitutional, rather than trigger any other form of scrutiny.
See NAACP, 834 F.3d at 442 (“[O]ur conclusion that the ban . . . is unreasonable means that it is
unconstitutional no matter what we label the forum. In other words, reasonableness is a bare minimum
in forum cases. Some types of forums require more than reasonableness, but none allow less.”).
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II. VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION AT THE SUPREME COURT
In Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, the Court permitted
(in a 5-4 decision) an incumbent teachers’ union to negotiate a collective
bargaining agreement with the school board, and to receive access to
teachers’ mailboxes, while denying access to a rival union.57 Vehemently,
Justice Brennan and three others dissented, finding the exclusive access
provision to constitute viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First
Amendment.58 In the decades since, the Court has developed a multifaceted
stance on the permissibility of viewpoint-based regulations. Generally, the
federal judiciary heavily presumes that viewpoint discrimination is
unconstitutional when it restricts speech that would otherwise be
permissible.59 However, the level of scrutiny, or test applied by the Court,
matters greatly to the broader determination of whether viewpoint neutrality
is absolutely mandated by the Constitution or not (spoiler: it’s not).
Based on judicial practice, it is “all but dispositive” to conclude that a law
regulating speech is content-based and viewpoint-discriminatory because it
implies that the state favors one viewpoint over another.60 This presumption
applies to all forums, since viewpoint neutrality is a requirement even in a
nonpublic forum. Conservative Justices are apt to declare that any finding
of viewpoint discrimination is per se invalid for private speech, but such a
rule has not been accepted by a majority of the Court.
A. Impermissible Viewpoint Discrimination
If a regulation restricts private speech in a public forum, viewpoint
discrimination is presumptively invalid. In Good News Club v. Milford Central School,
for example, the Court held that a school’s denial of a religiously-affiliated club
to hold afterschool meetings in their facilities constituted impermissible
viewpoint discrimination.61 Without technically undergoing a strict scrutiny
analysis but following two precedential cases,62 Justice Thomas found that the

57
58
59

60

61
62

Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 48–49 (1983).
Id. at 56 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995) (“[W]e have observed a
distinction between . . . content discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the
purposes of that limited forum, and, . . . viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible
when directed against speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.”).
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 382 (1992)); see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828 (declaring an “axiomatic” principle that
government regulations may not show favoritism based on the speaker or the substantive content
of the speech).
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 108–09 (2001).
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831; Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
393–94 (1993).
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viewpoint discrimination at issue was unconstitutional because the club was
excluded from participation solely based on its religious association.63
Viewpoint-based regulations on speech that is not fully protected can also
be scrutinized fatally. In Sorrell, the Court struck down a statute which barred
the sale and use of pharmacy records revealing individual doctors’
prescribing practices, to be used for pharmaceutical marketing, because it
imposed a discriminatory burden on certain speakers based on the content
of the speech.64 Since persons other than pharmaceutical manufacturers
could obtain the information, the restriction was viewpoint-based.65
Although commercial speech was at issue, the Court recognized that even
under a lesser heightened scrutiny, requiring the state to show the statute
directly advanced a substantial interest and was drawn to achieve said
interest, the statute was unconstitutional because of the differential treatment
applied based on viewpoint.66 Lower courts have followed suit here,
recognizing that “merely wrapping a law in the cloak of ‘commercial speech’
does not immunize it from the highest form of scrutiny due government
attempts to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.”67
Even viewpoint-based regulations that target expression deemed
“worthless” to public debate under the First Amendment are constitutionally
suspect.68 The question presented in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, in terms of
viewpoint discrimination, was whether an ordinance designed to criminalize
bias-motivated hate speech could criminalize some unprotected speech in a
category (fighting words based on race) and not all fighting words.69 The
plaintiffs had burned a cross on the yard of a black family, and were
prosecuted under this statute.70 The Court found the law facially

63

64
65
66
67

68
69

70

See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 108, 110–12. Three Justices—Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens—did
not think there was viewpoint discrimination at issue. Id. at 131 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 135–
37 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 563–64.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 571–72, 580.
Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Attorney General, Fla., 807 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2015). Some
professional speech proves to be more contentious because of the issues raised in the profession, and
courts differ as to how to regulate it. Contra King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 237 (3d Cir.
2014) (upholding a state statute that prohibited counselors from rendering their services of sexual
orientation change efforts to minors because it prevented them from “expressing [their] viewpoint in
a very specific way”). Compare NIFLA v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 844 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that a
state law requiring abortion clinics to disseminate notices stating the existence of publicly-funded
family-planning services did not violate the First Amendment), with Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238,
252 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that a state law requiring doctors to display sonograms and describe
fetuses to women seeking abortions constituted unconstitutionally compelled speech).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384–85 (1992).
Id. at 380–88; see also Kagan, supra note 8, at 417–18 (arguing that the ordinance in R.A.V. was
struck down because its ban on fighting words that only racists would use failed to protect the
“interest of listeners in a balanced debate on public issues”).
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379–80.
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unconstitutional and both content- and viewpoint-based.71 Specifically,
Scalia noted that the government could not lawfully regulate fighting words
“based on hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message
expressed.”72 Because the ordinance only prohibited fighting words based
on “race, color, creed, religion or gender,” it unconstitutionally selected
certain views expressed through fighting words to be restricted, according to
the R.A.V. majority.73
This decision was met with significant opposition, both from scholars and
other Justices, who felt that the ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad
but that the speech was not entitled to any sort of First Amendment
protection.74 Regulating wholly unprotected speech may still be permissible
even if viewpoint-discriminatory, as discussed in Subpart II.B.2. This
illustration is intended to reflect that it is a rare occurrence that the Justices
will agree on viewpoint neutrality and the level of scrutiny applied to contentbased restrictions.
B. Permissible Viewpoint Discrimination
Despite the heavy presumption against viewpoint discrimination, the
Supreme Court has never made a per se rule on its (un)constitutionality. Few
circumstances warrant the Court to stray from the viewpoint neutrality
mandate, but they do exist. One such category is when the government itself
speaks, free to select the views it wants to express.75 Such a categorization may
virtually strip the speech of nearly all First Amendment protection. The settings
where the Court has upheld viewpoint-based regulations are discussed presently.

71
72
73
74

75

Id. at 391–92.
Id. at 386.
Id. at 393–94.
See, e.g., id. at 400 (White, J., concurring) (“This categorical approach [to proscribable expression
on the basis of content] has provided a principled and narrowly focused means for distinguishing
between expression that the government may regulate freely and that which it may regulate on the
basis of content only upon a showing of compelling need.”). White concurred in the judgment to
invalidate the ordinance, reasoning that it was unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at 397; see also
Kagan, supra note 8, at 418 n.14. In her legal scholarship, Kagan also conceded that she personally
found the R.A.V. ordinance to be viewpoint-discriminatory, but that it ultimately would “not
dangerously have distorted public debate,” which seems to be a separate, though not mutually
exclusive, line of analysis. Kagan, supra note 8, at 419. Thus, Kagan has made clear that certain
viewpoint-based restrictions would not run counter to the broader goal of free expression. Id.
See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467, 472 (2009) (holding that monuments
represented government speech, even in public parks, and that the Free Speech Clause “does not
regulate government speech”); see also Mark Strasser, Government Speech and Circumvention of the First
Amendment, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 37, 59 (2016) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s lack of
limitations on government free speech “give[s] the government an easy way to avoid First
Amendment speech limitations”).
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1. Schools
Although the First Amendment applies to public schools, the Court has
recognized that it is an arena in which viewpoint-based regulations may be
permissible.76 In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the
Court recognized this principle, but also noted that schools may be justified
in restricting speech, so long as such censorship is “caused by something
more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”77
But the Tinker test, permitting speech restrictions if it would substantially
and materially disrupt the school’s operation, implicitly recognized that
viewpoint discrimination may be constitutional in schools while selectively
censoring certain views should not be. Despite its analytical structure, this
test did not create as bright a line as it may appear for exactly when viewpoint
discrimination is afoot in schools.
A twenty-first century case may demonstrate how federal courts still
struggle with analyzing questionably viewpoint-based regulations in schools.
In B.W.A. v. Farmington R-7 School District, the Eighth Circuit found that a
public school ban on clothing depicting the Confederate flag did not violate
free speech and did not constitute viewpoint discrimination.78 At the time,
there were several racially charged incidents at the school, which led to the
school district’s decision to ban all clothing depicting the Confederate flag.79
The circuit court panel then went on to analyze the restriction through
Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test in schools.80 Given the history of racial
tension at the school, the court felt there was evidence that images of the
Confederate flag caused a substantial disruption, and such a clothing ban
was constitutional.81
At first, the Eighth Circuit seemed to suggest that the ban on clothing
containing the Confederate flag was permissible viewpoint discrimination so
long as it comported with Tinker, but then concluded its First Amendment
analysis as follows:
Contrary to [the students’] assertion, viewpoint discrimination by school
officials is not violative of the First Amendment if the Tinker standard
requiring a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption or material
interference is met. . . . Based on the evidence in the record, the school’s ban
76
77
78
79
80

81

See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
Id. at 509.
554 F.3d 734, 740–41 (8th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 736–37.
Id. at 741; see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505–06 (arguing that a school could not send students home
for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War because the armbands were pure speech
and not disruptive conduct). The Eighth Circuit felt that Tinker’s framework should be applied
rather than Morse. See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
B.W.A., 554 F.3d at 739, 741.
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on the flag was reasonably related to a substantial disruption, did not amount
to viewpoint discrimination, and did not violate the First Amendment. 82

Perhaps the Court meant to say that the ban was not impermissible viewpoint
discrimination, but instead conflated a constitutional ban with necessarily
being viewpoint-neutral. Several other circuits have followed suit, finding
that a prohibition on the display—on clothing or otherwise—of the
Confederate flag in schools does not violate the First Amendment.83 Thus,
it is more likely that the refusal to permit a display of the Confederate flag is
viewpoint discrimination. However, this error—clerical or legal—reflects
the strong hesitation from writing an opinion that specifically finds viewpoint
discrimination to be permissible.
In Morse v. Frederick, the Court did not apply Tinker and upheld a sort of
viewpoint discrimination in the school setting, finding that a suspension of a
student for carrying a banner emblazoned with the phrase “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS” to school did not violate his First Amendment rights.84 The
conservative Justices were in the majority, maintaining that the principal was
within her rights as a school administrator because she reasonably believed
the student’s banner promoted illegal drug use.85 Even the dissent, composed
of Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, conceded that “it might well be
appropriate to tolerate some targeted viewpoint discrimination in this unique
setting”—though arguing it was impermissible in this case.86
This is not to say that viewpoint discrimination is always permissible in
schools, nor that there is unanimity over finding a speech regulation is
viewpoint-based. For example, in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, a five-Justice
majority held that a public law school’s refusal to recognize a religious-based
student organization because it did not maintain open eligibility membership
was reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.87 In dissent, the conservative end of
the Court argued that the policy—even though coined “nondiscriminatory”—amounted to viewpoint discrimination, and that “we have
never taken the view that a little viewpoint discrimination is acceptable.”88

82
83

84
85
86
87
88

Id. at 740–41 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426, 440 (4th Cir. 2013) (banning clothing with a
Confederate flag in school was constitutional); Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 335–36 (6th Cir. 2010)
(finding Confederate flag displays would be a substantial disruption pursuant to Tinker); McAllum
v. Cash, 585 F.3d 214, 222–24 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding that a school ban on any display of the
Confederate flag did not violate free speech rights).
551 U.S. 393, 397, 408–10 (2007).
Id. at 397, 409–10.
Id. at 439–40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
561 U.S. 661, 669 (2010).
Id. at 717–18 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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2. Unprotected Speech
Despite the holding in R.A.V., several Justices recognize that states should
be able to regulate speech, even if in a viewpoint-based manner, that is
wholly unprotected by the First Amendment. In Justice White’s concurrence
in R.A.V., joined by Justices Blackmun, O’Connor, and Stevens, he did not
refute the finding that the regulation was content-based (or even viewpointbased), but that the government should be free to regulate this sort of
expression deemed historically proscribable.89 White reasoned that if the
state could ban all fighting words, it should be able to ban a subset of them
“without creating the danger of driving viewpoints from the marketplace.”90
Even Scalia’s majority opinion in R.A.V. recognized exceptions to the
principle that viewpoint-based regulations are impermissible. First, if the
“basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the
entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or
viewpoint discrimination exists.”91 Second, if “the subclass happens to be
associated with particular ‘secondary effects’ of the speech, so that the
regulation is ‘justified without reference to the content of the . . . speech.’”92
Third and finally, a statute does not need to be neutral “so long as the nature
of the content discrimination is such that there is no realistic possibility that
official suppression of ideas is afoot.”93
3. Non-Coercive Government Subsidies and Speech
The Court has permitted a form of viewpoint discrimination if the
government is the one doing the talking. This has been recognized in the
subsidy context as well as when the state action constitutes “government
speech” that does not coerce private speakers into espousing a certain view.94
89
90
91

92

93
94

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 399–400 (1992) (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 401. White also argued that the content-based ordinance would survive strict scrutiny even
if it was applied. Id. at 403–04.
Id. at 388. The Third Circuit also upheld a statute that fit into this category of permissible contentbased regulations identified in R.A.V. See King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 237 (3d Cir. 2014)
(“[T]he reason professional speech receives diminished protection under the First Amendment—i.e.,
because of the State’s longstanding authority to protect its citizens from ineffective or harmful
professional practices—is precisely the reason New Jersey targeted [sexual orientation change efforts]
counseling . . . .”); see also Doe v. Governor of N.J., 783 F.3d 150, 151 (3d Cir. 2015) (following King
that the same statute did not violate a minor’s right to receive information).
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389 (emphasis omitted) (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U.S. 41, 48 (1986)). The Fifth Circuit, quoting the categorical exceptions outlined by Scalia in
R.A.V., upheld a state statute prohibiting so-called “animal crush videos” because the statute
“regulates a content-defined subclass based on its secondary effects and is justified without reference
to the content of the speech.” United States v. Richards, 755 F.3d 269, 277 (5th Cir. 2014).
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 390.
See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245–46 (2015)
(holding that the government’s decision to refuse to approve a license plate design featuring the
Confederate flag was not unconditional because the license plates constituted government speech
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For example, in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, the Court upheld the
NEA’s “decency and respect” standard for awarding public funding,
reasoning that such criteria did not “silence speakers by expressly
‘threaten[ing] censorship of ideas.’”95 While never does the Court say that
yes, this is viewpoint discrimination and yes, this is permissible, it finds
constitutional the government’s decision to “merely [choose] to fund one
activity to the exclusion of the other.”96 Scalia, in a concurring opinion,
states emphatically that the NEA standard by its terms establishes viewpointbased criteria, which is “perfectly” constitutional: “None of this has anything
to do with abridging anyone’s speech. . . . [T]he difference between me and
the Court is that I regard the distinction between ‘abridging’ speech and
funding it as a fundamental divide, on this side of which the First
Amendment is inapplicable.”97
Like subsidies, government speech may permissibly prefer certain views
to the exclusion of others. This may include government speech that
contains elements of private speech. While discussed in greater detail in
Subpart III.A, Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans demonstrates this notion,
where the Court upheld a decision by the Texas Department of Motor
Vehicles Board to reject a specialty license plate bearing the Confederate flag
because it was government speech.98 The Fifth Circuit had reversed the
district court’s ruling for the board and argued that the plate designs were
private speech; thus the board’s refusal to approve their design was
“constitutionally forbidden viewpoint discrimination.”99 The majority of the
Court found otherwise, determining that the plates did not constitute any
sort of forum, and was rather government speech because the message
conveyed suggested it was done so on behalf of the state.100 And when the
government speaks as a general matter, Justice Breyer wrote, “[I]t is not
barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it

95
96
97
98
99
100

and the government is not constrained by the First Amendment in what it chooses to say unless it
seeks to “compel private persons to convey the government’s speech”); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173, 194 (1991) (holding that the government did not violate the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights
in prohibiting Title X funding for family planning programs to be used in programs that promote
abortion, stating that the government does not unconstitutionally discriminate “on the basis of
viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to advance certain permissible goals,
because the program in advancing those goals necessarily discourages alternative goals”).
524 U.S. 569, 582–83 (1998) (alteration in original) (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393).
Id. at 588 (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 193) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 590, 598–99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
135 S. Ct. 2239, 2253 (2015).
Id. at 2245.
Id. at 2246, 2248, 2250. The majority reached this conclusion by analyzing the factors laid out in
Summum for determining whether the specialty license plates constitute government speech: history
of how the speech is communicated, whether they are “closely identified in the public mind with
the [State],” and the control exercised by the government. Id. at 2246–48, 2250 (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S.
460, 472 (2009)).
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says” or to take a position, so long as it does not attempt to compel private
individuals to express such speech.101 Further, Breyer recognized:
Our determination that Texas’s specialty license plate designs are
government speech does not mean that the designs do not also implicate the
free speech rights of private persons. We have acknowledged that drivers
who display a State’s selected license plate designs convey the messages
communicated through those designs. And we have recognized that the
First Amendment stringently limits a State’s authority to compel a private
party to express a view with which the private party disagrees. But here,
compelled private speech is not at issue. And just as Texas cannot require
SCV to convey ‘the State’s ideological message,’ SCV cannot force Texas to
include a Confederate battle flag on its specialty license plates.102

Breyer’s distinction here rests upon the right of Texas to refuse to be
associated with a message containing the Confederate flag. While necessarily
exercising discretion to refuse the design because of the view it expressed, this
form of government speech, according to the majority’s interpretation,
simply cannot be held to a viewpoint-neutral forum analysis.
4. Other Plausible Exceptions to the Viewpoint Neutrality Principle
While the Court has not established another discrete area in which
viewpoint discrimination may be permissible, there are certain possibilities
where a viewpoint-based regulation could conceivably survive constitutional
challenge. There may be interests compelling enough to survive such an
analysis. First, a valid Establishment Clause claim could plausibly be one
such example, but the Court has not addressed this possibility.103 Second, a
more amorphous balancing with national security concerns, where the state
interests are so high as to outweigh First Amendment rights, is conceivably
an area where the Court would permit viewpoint discrimination.104 This has
not been supported by the case law, but it is important to acknowledge the
possibility of views being restricted in the name of national security. A third
area is viewpoint-based regulations of commercial speech. The Court has
yet to clearly articulate whether a viewpoint-based regulation on commercial

101
102
103

104

Id. at 2245–46.
Id. at 2252–53 (citations omitted).
See Little Pencil, LLC v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 5:14-CV-014-C, 2014 WL 11531267, at
*10 (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2014) (finding that restricting a for-profit entity from advancing its religious
message on school property differs from facility-use and flyer-distribution cases in which the
Supreme Court found restrictions on religious messages to be impermissible, though the question
was left unsettled by the Supreme Court as to whether an alleged “Establishment Clause violation
can justify viewpoint discrimination” (quoting Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J. Inc. v. Stafford
Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 530 (3d Cir. 2004))).
See, e.g., Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 838 F.3d 451, 458 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Ordinarily, of
course, the protection of constitutional rights would be the highest public interest at issue in a case.
That is not necessarily true here, however, because the State Department has asserted a very strong
public interest in national defense and national security.”).
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speech may be subject to strict (or higher) scrutiny, or may fall within the
“relaxed scrutiny” of Central Hudson.105 Sorrell left open the possibility—to the
detriment of First Amendment litigants in lower courts—that a viewpointbased regulation of commercial speech may be constitutional so long as it
survives Central Hudson,106 even if it would not survive strict scrutiny.
It seems that direct recognition of viewpoint discrimination in any forum
against protected speech—perhaps save commercial speech—will trigger an
extreme form of strict scrutiny that is commonly fatal in fact. Arguably, there
is no such thing as permissible viewpoint discrimination of protected speech
in a forum.107 In considering how lower courts are interpreting this
ambiguity, and consequently shaping the doctrine for litigants, Subpart III
focuses on two key areas of concern: 1) taking the regulation outside of the
forum analysis; and 2) expanding (or deferring to) government discretion in
limited public and nonpublic forums.
III. VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION AT THE COURTS OF APPEALS
Because of the trepidation to employ the term “viewpoint discrimination”
in any favorable opinion to the government, federal courts are hesitant to find
any viewpoint-based regulation constitutional. But that is not to say it never
happens. Further, a survey of federal appellate decisions since 2014 begs the
question if determinations of viewpoint neutrality are properly conducted for
seemingly constitutional, content-based speech regulations. Table 1 highlights
the relevant cases decided by the federal courts of appeals since 2014 that
addressed questions of viewpoint discrimination. This search recovered over
200 cases, which were then scrubbed to review only First Amendment
claims—since many equal protection and other discrimination claims were
included in the results. The “Other” column includes cases that were decided
on the merits but where the regulation was not content-based at all, as well as
cases without final judgments: this includes, but is not limited to, reversals of
dismissals, remanding for reconsideration of the viewpoint discrimination

105

106
107

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017). Compare id. at 1764 (noting that “[the Court] need not
resolve this debate” whether a trademark constitutes commercial speech because the viewpointbased provision at issue in the Lanham Act failed Central Hudson scrutiny regardless), with id. at 1769
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“I continue to believe that when the government seeks to restrict truthful
speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the
speech in question may be characterized as ‘commercial.’” (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citation omitted)), and id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“To the extent trademarks qualify as
commercial speech, they are an example of why that term or category does not serve as a blanket
exemption from the First Amendment’s requirement of viewpoint neutrality.”). More attention is
given to the opinions in Matal later in this Comment. See infra Subpart IV.B.
See supra notes 64–66.
See, e.g., Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1050 n.1 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Viewpoint-based
restrictions on citizens engaging in such [political] speech on public or private land would be per se
invalid.”).
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claim, or upholding or denying a qualified immunity defense. Table 1 also
does not account for any cases that were overturned by the Supreme Court.
TABLE 1
DECISIONS BY FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
INVOLVING VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION, 2014–2017108
Circuit

11th
10th
9th
8th
7th
6th
5th
4th
3rd
2nd
1st
D.C.
Federal
Total

Upheld State Action
Viewpoint- Content- Other
based
based but
Viewpoint
Neutral
1109
3

2110
1111

4

8
4
1
1
2

1

2
2
1
1
1
26

2

2
3

Invalidated State Action
Viewpoint- Content- Other
based
based but
Viewpoint
Neutral
1
2
1
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1

2
10

2
2
7

10

10

Based on the cases, it is exceedingly rare that a federal court will uphold
a regulation that is deemed to be viewpoint-based—which is in line with
Supreme Court precedent. Courts most often uphold state action against a
First Amendment challenge by determining it is content-based but
viewpoint-neutral. This frequently occurs in nonpublic or limited public
forums. Thus, it is important to review in more detail how courts come to
such conclusions by taking a few example cases, analyzed in Subpart III.B.
108
109
110

111

This search was conducted by gathering all cases heard from 2014 to 2017 in Westlaw with the
following search key: “viewpoint discriminat!” OR (viewpoint /s discriminat!).
See Mech v. School Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding as
viewpoint-based state action that constituted government speech).
See Machete Prods. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2015) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to
selective government funding to incentivize productions of films in Texas); United States v.
Richards, 755 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 2014) (upholding animal crushing statute because it only covered
unprotected form of obscenity).
See ACLU of N.C. v. Tennyson, 815 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2016) (upholding specialty license plate
program as government speech).
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Viewpoint-neutral determinations, without a thorough analysis or
consideration for how they could be applied, may create more opportunities
for government discretion, and viewpoint discrimination to occur in practice.
In addition to questions regarding viewpoint neutrality findings, the impact
of Walker’s holding may give rise to further concerns that viewpoint
discrimination is permissible if an expression is mixed with government
speech and not in a forum, as discussed presently.
A. Impact of Forum-Shifting
As discussed in Subpart II.B, there are rare circumstances in which the
Court has both recognized viewpoint discrimination in a regulation, and still
upheld it. Yet, there continues to be disagreement in the federal judiciary
across the country as to how to evaluate each step: finding that a regulation
differentiates based on viewpoint (rather than content), and then analyzing
its constitutionality. In particular, the federal courts of appeals have seen
after Walker how taking a First Amendment claim outside of the forum
analysis effectively releases viewpoint discrimination from consideration.
A deeper dive into Walker illustrates the impact of what happens when
First Amendment considerations involving mixed private-government
speech are taken outside of a forum. Additionally, consideration for how the
federal courts of appeals hearing specialty license plate cases decided before
and after Walker reflect the discord across the judiciary on what is viewpoint
discrimination and when it may be permissible.
1. Walker Whiplash
As previously noted, the Court in Walker held that the Texas DMV could
refuse to approve specialty license plate designs because the plates amounted
to government speech, despite mixed elements of private speech.112 Because
of such a determination, the majority reasoned that viewpoint discrimination
was appropriate because there was no forum at issue, and no compulsion of
private speakers to espouse a particular view.
Four Justices felt quite differently, vehemently declaring the majority’s
understanding of the expression as government speech to be “a large and
painful bite [taken] out of the First Amendment.”113 Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined the dissent written by Justice Alito,
who argued the specialty license plates should be categorized as private
speech in a limited public forum.114 Certainly, in considering the factors in
Summum, the dissent found elements of government speech within the plates,
112
113
114

Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2252–53 (2015).
Id. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2262.
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but they were “essentially commissioned by private entities” and expressed a
“message chosen by those entities,” which equated them more to private
speech.115 The design scheme was fairly newly established, in order to obtain
revenue (each cost more than $8,000), and Alito felt it was a slippery slope to
consider such speech governmental, freeing it from most First Amendment
restraints.116 To push his point forward, Alito analogized:
It is essential that government be able to express its own viewpoint, the Court
reminds us, because otherwise, how would it promote its programs, like
recycling and vaccinations? So when Texas issues a “Rather Be Golfing”
plate, but not a “Rather Be Playing Tennis” or “Rather Be Bowling” plate,
it is furthering a state policy to promote golf but not tennis or bowling. And
when Texas allows motorists to obtain a Notre Dame license plate but not a
University of Southern California plate, it is taking sides in that long-time
rivalry.117

The dissent felt this form of “pure viewpoint discrimination” clearly violated
the First Amendment when applied to private speech.118 Although Alito did
not explicitly contemplate that such a form of viewpoint discrimination is per
se unconstitutional, he did not conduct a strict scrutiny analysis.119
As the Justices clashed over each facet of the viewpoint discrimination
analysis, the circuit courts before and after Walker also struggled with
evaluating similar claims, and whether license plates constituted a “forum”
within First Amendment analysis. Two members of the Fifth Circuit, hearing
the Walker case before certiorari was granted, had utilized similar reasoning to
the Walker dissent when they held the refusal of the Confederate flag design
was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination of private speech.120 In
reaching its conclusion, the court noted that they were not alone in reaching
such a result: “In fact, the majority of the other circuits to consider this question
have held that the state engaged in viewpoint discrimination when it denied a
specialty license plate based on the speaker’s message.”121 This support
assumes, without qualifying in this context, that viewpoint discrimination is
patently unconstitutional. The lone dissenter, Judge Jerry Smith, did not
disagree that it was viewpoint discrimination, but felt the refusal was shielded
115
116

117
118
119
120

121

Id. at 2260.
See id. at 2255–56 (“While all license plates unquestionably contain some government
speech . . . Texas has converted the remaining space on its specialty plates into little mobile
billboards on which motorists can display their own messages. And what Texas did here was to
reject one of the [private] messages . . . because the State thought that many of its citizens would
find the message offensive. That is blatant viewpoint discrimination.”).
Id. at 2255 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2262.
See id. at 2263 (“This rationale [that the plate would distract drivers] cannot withstand strict
scrutiny.”).
Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Vandergriff, 759 F.3d 388, 397–98 (5th Cir. 2014).
Vandergriff was the Chairman of the Texas Board of the Department of Motor Vehicles at the
time.
Id. at 400.
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by the government speech doctrine—as the Walker majority ultimately
concluded.122 Further, he found the comparison to other circuits unpersuasive,
as they were all decided before Summum, except for one.123
In between the Fifth Circuit’s initial decision and the Walker opinion, the
Second Circuit heard its own specialty license plate design dispute in Children
First Foundation, Inc. v. Fiala.124 In an opinion later vacated and remanded,
then dismissed by the plaintiff after Walker, the majority of the Second Circuit
panel found that the program was private speech in a nonpublic forum, and
not government speech outside the forum context.125 Similar to the Walker
dissent, the court applied the Summum factors and had “little difficulty”
concluding it was private speech, but that the plates were still government
property, creating a nonpublic forum.126 However, it argued the denial of a
“Choose Life” license plate was done in a viewpoint-neutral manner because
the program’s policy was to completely exclude “controversial political and
social issues—regardless of the viewpoint espoused.”127 Judge Livingston
dissented, finding that the program led to unbridled discretion for the State,
“thereby inviting viewpoint discrimination.”128 Thus, the Second Circuit
upheld the program, similar to the Supreme Court in Walker, but for
completely different reasons. They disagreed on the category of the
speech—private versus government—and disagreed about whether
viewpoint discrimination was at play.
Given that the Walker majority effectively removed this form of speech
outside the protection of the First Amendment129 by declaring it government
speech, other circuits followed suit. Indeed, the fears articulated in the Walker
dissent, coupled with concerns expressed by both opinions in Children First
Foundation, may have been realized in the discretion afforded to North
Carolina’s specialty license plate program by the Fourth Circuit. In ACLU of
North Carolina v. Tata, the Fourth Circuit had ruled in favor of a plaintiff who
argued that North Carolina’s refusal to grant their pro-choice plate design
122
123
124
125

126
127
128
129

Id. at 401 (Smith, J., dissenting).
Id. at 403–04.
Children First Found., Inc. v. Fiala, 790 F.3d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated, 611 F. App’x 741 (2d
Cir. 2015).
Id. Interestingly, the Second Circuit felt that the Supreme Court “has not yet articulated a test to
distinguish government speech from private speech,” even though this was decided after Summum.
Id. at 338. It appears the Court was waiting for Walker to confirm that was the proper analysis.
Id. at 338, 340–42.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 353–54 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
Technically, this speech is still protected by the First Amendment because government speech
cannot compel private speakers to espouse a certain view, but other protections seen in forum
analysis or other forms of private speech are removed. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Inc. 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015) (“That is not to say that a government’s ability to
express itself is without restriction. . . . [T]he Free Speech Clause itself may constrain the
government’s speech if, for example, the government seeks to compel private persons to convey the
government’s speech.”).
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while approving a pro-life design violated the First Amendment.130 The state’s
petition for writ of certiorari was granted, and the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded following its decision in Walker.131 After applying the Court’s
reasoning there, the Fourth Circuit then reversed its earlier decision and held
that the specialty license plate program was government speech; therefore the
state had the right to refuse (or accept) designs conveying certain messages.132
As is the trend with viewpoint-based claims, not everyone hearing the case
agreed, with Judge Wynn attempting to distinguish the circumstances in
North Carolina from those in Walker. In dissent, he argued that the Walker
holding should be understood narrowly, and that the speech expressed in
specialty license plates is not “pure government speech,” which would impact
the scrutiny applied and keep it in some sort of forum.133 Further, Wynn
reasoned that the plate “presents mixed speech—with private speech
components that prohibit viewpoint discrimination. . . . [by] allowing a
‘Choose Life’ specialty plate while repeatedly rejecting a ‘Respect Choice’
plate, North Carolina violated the First Amendment.”134 A critical distinction
from Walker was North Carolina’s acceptance of one view—“Choose Life”—
and the rejection of the opposing view—“Respect Choice.” Such state action
involving mixed speech was, to Judge Wynn, “viewpoint discrimination in
violation of the First Amendment.”135 But this argument failed to convince a
majority in the Fourth Circuit to strike down the program. Perhaps then,
Walker’s reasoning could threaten other mixed but seemingly private
messages, such as those at schools,136 or even public advertising.
After Walker, by declaring an expression to constitute government speech,
no further analysis beyond compulsion is required to comport with the First
Amendment. Indeed, every Supreme Court Justice (seemingly), the Fifth
and Fourth Circuits, and Judge Livingston on the Second Circuit agreed that
refusing a license plate design was in fact viewpoint discrimination. As Justice
Alito flatly stated: “Whatever it means to motorists who display that symbol

130
131
132
133
134

135
136

742 F.3d 563, 566 (4th Cir. 2014).
Berger v. ACLU of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 2886, 2886 (2015).
ACLU of N.C. v. Tennyson, 815 F.3d 183, 185 (4th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 185–86 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
Id. at 186. This selective decision-making of refusal and acceptance seemed to be under
consideration in Fiala in the Second Circuit. See Children First Found., Inc. v. Fiala, 790 F.3d 328,
346 (2d Cir. 2015) (“It is not our place to evaluate and weigh the various hot button issues of our
time against one another, assigning to each a specific place in the landscape of public debate in this
country.”).
Tennyson, 815 F.3d at 187 (Wynn, J. dissenting).
See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2256 (2015) (Alito,
J., dissenting). (“What if a state college or university did the same thing with a similar billboard or
a campus bulletin board or dorm list serve? What if it allowed private messages that are consistent
with prevailing views on campus but banned those that disturbed some students or faculty? Can
there be any doubt that these examples of viewpoint discrimination would violate the First
Amendment? I hope not, but the future uses of today’s precedent remain to be seen.”).
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and to those who see it, the [Confederate] flag expresses a viewpoint.”137
Permissible viewpoint discrimination may be extended to apply to more
mixed-speech if the Court finds no analysis is necessary so long as
government speech is at issue and there is no compulsion of private speech.
2. Foreshadowing Forum Shifts Elsewhere
The worry with the Walker Court’s decision to cabin a viewpoint-based
regulation from heightened scrutiny so long as it constitutes government
speech, is largely that it is unclear how far this principle can be applied to
mixed private-government speech.138 Ironically, in Mech v. School Board of
Palm Beach County, the Eleventh Circuit quoted Alito’s dissent when it found
government speech was at issue, noting: “Because characterizing speech as
government speech ‘strips it of all First Amendment protection’ under the
Free Speech Clause, we do not do so lightly.”139 In Mech, a school board’s
decision to remove tutoring business signs from its school fences was held to
be constitutional because it was government speech.140 Unlike in the
specialty license plate line of cases discussed previously, the signs were not
controversial on their face, advertising for “The Happy/Fun Math Tutor”
organization.141 However, the tutor was a retired pornographic film star,
performing in hundreds of films and who still owned a production company
that formerly produced pornographic material.142 Finding that the
advertising banners were technically endorsed by the school under the terms
of school policy, the Court sided with the State that this was government
speech, and therefore the schools were free to remove signs with which they
disagreed.143 While the Court never flatly stated that the ban was viewpoint
discrimination, it argued that for government speech, the state is free to select
the views it wants to express.144 Thus, determining that the banners were
government speech was wholly dispositive of the First Amendment claim at
issue, and no further viewpoint discrimination analysis was required.
Airports may be another area of mixed private speech and state
regulation that could cause headaches to courts trying to decipher the
viewpoint neutrality mandate. In NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, the Third
Circuit found the city’s ban on noncommercial content in airport advertising

137
138

139
140
141
142
143
144

Id. at 2262.
See Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070, 1074 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The Supreme
Court has not articulated a precise test for separating government speech from private
speech . . . .”).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1072–73.
Id. at 1072.
Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1074.
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space to be unreasonable within the limited public forum context, and
therefore unconstitutional.145 In its brief before the appeal was litigated, the
NAACP argued that the Third Circuit could rule in its favor just because the
statute was not viewpoint-neutral: “On its face, the Policy allows the City to
display ads expressing the City’s views on any and all topics, even on
potentially controversial social issues—and the City has in fact displayed such
ads—while prohibiting organizations with contrary views from displaying
their own ads.”146 However, because it could rule on unreasonableness, the
court forewent any viewpoint discrimination analysis because it was
unnecessary, while still acknowledging the intent behind the statute might
have been viewpoint-discriminatory.147
In dissent, Judge Hardiman felt that the ban was a reasonable attempt to
“avoid controversy” at the airport—a vague rationale that seemed to cut
against the free flow of ideas.148 Hardiman also, seemingly begrudgingly,
attempted to follow Walker and applied it to the State’s ability to regulate its
airport advertising space. Specifically, he wrote:
In addition, with the power to express noncommercial positions and
exclude those to the contrary, the City could create an environment in which
passersby are led to believe that the City’s positions are
uncontested. . . . This illusion of consensus, which uniquely threatens the
marketplace of ideas, is similar to the concern Justice Alito warned of in his
dissent in Walker. In response to that concern, the Court has instructed that
when the government speaks, “it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause
from determining the content of what it says” . . . . Based on that directive,
I must conclude that the Policy does not implicate viewpoint discrimination
concerns that would plainly exist if private speech were at issue.149

The City utilized a similar line of argument in its reply brief, where it argued
that permitting government speech and not private speech should not
constitute viewpoint discrimination after Walker and Reed. Specifically, “in
the Airport advertising space forum—where we rigorously prohibit private
noncommercial speech—we have no obligation to allow Plaintiff to speak,
even if we have the opportunity to speak ourselves.”150 Ultimately, perhaps
to avoid controversial consideration of viewpoint neutrality, the Third
Circuit avoided these arguments, and only Hardiman supported the
reasoning expressed in the City’s brief that Walker should apply to this sort of
regulation in such a forum.

145
146
147
148
149
150

834 F.3d 435, 448–49 (3d Cir. 2016).
Brief for Appellee at 23, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, 834 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2016) (No. 151002).
NAACP, 834 F.3d at 449 n.7.
Id. at 449 (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 457.
Reply Brief for Appellant at 16, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, 834 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2016) (No.
15-1002).
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While this was a single dissenting judge positing that Walker could be
extended in this manner, it reflects ambiguity over the extent of the
government speech rationale, and the absence of an articulated approach to
managing viewpoint discrimination concerns. At minimum, it suggests that
a more precise standard for analyzing viewpoint-based regulations involving
mixed government speech should be provided.
B. Government Discretion in Limited Public or Nonpublic Forums
While Walker’s government speech directive may not have spread to other
forums such as airports yet, judges continue to disagree about what constitutes
viewpoint discrimination, the type of speech, or the forum at issue. Even if a
speech regulation applies to a nonpublic or limited, designated, or traditional
public forum, the impact of subjectivity and discretion may permit otherwiseimpermissible viewpoint discrimination to trickle into state action. Indeed,
even facially viewpoint-neutral statutes “do not eliminate the danger of
censorship presented by a facially content-based statute, as future government
officials may one day wield such statutes to suppress disfavored speech.”151
Public agencies exercise extensive discretion, for example, in approving
advertising in public spaces, like airports or buses. Not all circuits analyze
speech regulations over public advertising in the same manner, or treat them
as the same forum. For example, the Ninth Circuit analyzes regulations of
local bus advertising as a nonpublic forum while others view them as
designated public forums.152 In Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King County
(“SeaMAC”) the Ninth Circuit found that the county bus advertising system was
a constitutionally content-based, but viewpoint-neutral means of regulating
speech in the forum.153 Metro had approved an ad by SeaMAC, a non-profit
organization opposed to U.S. support for Israel, that displayed messages such
as “Israel’s War Crimes: Your Tax Dollars at Work.”154 After extensive media
coverage (but before the ads ran), pro-Israel groups submitted bus ads to Metro
that displayed messages such as “Support Israel, Defeat Islamic Jihad.”155 The
county withdrew approval of the SeaMAC ad and rejected the pro-Israel ads,
then revised its policy to exclude any political or ideological advertising.156 The
151
152

153
154
155
156

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2229 (2015).
See Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King Cty., 781 F.3d 489, 498–99 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We
recognize that other courts have held that similar transit advertising programs constitute designated
public forums. Some of those courts, in our view, mistakenly concluded that if the government
opens a forum and is willing to accept political speech, it has necessarily signaled an intent to create
a designated public forum.”). Dissenting in SeaMAC, Judge Christen argued that the bus was a
designated public forum, and should be remanded for a proper strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at 503
(Christen, J., dissenting).
Id. at 501–03.
Id. at 494–95.
Id.
Id. at 495.
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Ninth Circuit seemed satisfied that the regulation was constitutional where
county discretion was applied in a viewpoint-neutral manner.157
The First Circuit, faced with a similar legal question about its bus
advertising program and ads regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, came
to an analogous conclusion as the Ninth Circuit did in SeaMAC—that this was
a nonpublic forum and that the discretionary policy was exercised without
discriminating by viewpoint.158 In American Freedom Defense Initiative v.
Massachusetts Bay Transport Authority (“MBTA”), the MBTA had approved an
ad depicting different maps of Israel and Palestine that demonstrated alleged
Palestinian loss of land.159 A pro-Israeli group submitted several ads in
response, and its third version was rejected because the juxtaposition of the
“civilized man” and “the savage” above a “Support Israel” caption contained
demeaning information that disparaged individuals or groups according to
the MBTA board.160 The majority of the First Circuit found that the MBTA’s
consideration of linguistic and grammatical distinctions in the advertisements
and that it accepted some of the pro-Israel ads, reflected that the policy was
viewpoint-neutral.161 Thus, the subjective conclusions by the MBTA of what
is “disparaging” and what is not were not found to be viewpoint-based.
Like in SeaMAC, there was a dissenter in MBTA, but unlike the dissenting
judge in SeaMAC, Judge Stahl felt that the transit authority’s rejection of a
pro-Israel ad was “neither viewpoint neutral nor reasonable.”162 He pointed
out that the pro-Palestine ad containing maps depicted a message that
arguably demeaned and disparaged Israelis as people who caused a refugee
crisis, violating the regulatory scheme, and that riders only had access to one
viewpoint on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.163 Judge Stahl distinguished
from SeaMAC, noting that the transit system policy there rejected all pending
ads related to the political conflict, while “the MBTA’s incongruous decision
to post the Committee for Peace ad, but reject AFDI’s submissions, at the
very least, raises the specter of viewpoint discrimination by the MBTA.”164
Even though the MBTA was following protocol of language and
grammar in its decisions, the power of discretion in selecting whether speech
will be published can leave the door open for viewpoint discrimination. A
case recently decided in federal district court in Washington, D.C., also
157
158
159
160

161
162
163
164

Id. at 501–03.
Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 781 F.3d 571, 581–84 (1st Cir. 2015).
Id. at 574–75.
Id. at 576–77; accord Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 258–59 (1952) (upholding a state statute
that criminalized the exhibit of any play or sketch portraying a class of citizens in a significantly
negative light, reasoning that the state should have power to punish libel “directed at a defined
group”).
781 F.3d at 584–87.
Id. at 593 (Stahl, J., dissenting).
Id. at 594.
Id. at 595.
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brought by the American Freedom Defense Initiative,165 suggests how forum
analysis and “viewpoint neutral” use of discretion could continue to disguise
plausibly viewpoint-discriminatory actions in limited or nonpublic forums.
IV. MATAL V. TAM
The Court had an opportunity to provide the federal judiciary and the
Bar with a more precise viewpoint neutrality mandate in its decision in Matal
v. Tam.166 Simon Tam, an Asian-American musician, claimed his First
Amendment rights were violated through viewpoint discrimination after the
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) refused to register a trademark of his
band’s name, “The Slants.”167 Specifically, the PTO reasoned that the name,
a derogatory term for individuals of Asian descent, may “disparage . . . or
bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute” persons of Asian descent, violating the
disparagement clause of the Lanham Act.168 The PTO normally employs a
two-part test to evaluate whether a trademark would be disparaging: first,
consideration of the meaning of the trademark in question, and whether it
refers to “identifiable persons, institutions, beliefs or national symbols,”169 and
second, whether such a meaning would be “disparaging to a substantial
composite of the referenced group.”170 Applying this test, the PTO rejected
Tam’s trademark request because “a substantial composite of persons . . . find
the term in the applied-for mark offensive.”171 Tam appealed the denial to
the PTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, where the panel affirmed the
PTO’s original decision.172 Then, Tam filed suit in federal court.
A. Tam at the Federal Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the government
unconstitutionally denied a trademark registration because the trademark
violated the disparagement provision of the Lanham Act.173 The en banc
majority found such a provision to amount to viewpoint discrimination of
private speech—not government speech. To decide otherwise, they
reasoned, “would transform every act of government registration into one of
165

166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

See Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. WMATA, 245 F. Supp. 3d 205, 211–13 (D.D.C. 2017) (finding
public bus advertising space to constitute a nonpublic forum, and its decision to close the space to
issue-oriented ads—even though it had “published issue-oriented ads in the past”—was viewpoint
neutral). The decision was not appealed to the D.C. Circuit.
137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
Id. at 1751.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012)).
Id. at 1753 (quoting TMEP § 1203.03(b)(i) (8th ed. Apr. 2017)).
Id. at 1754 (quoting TMEP § 1203.03(b)(i) (8th ed. Apr. 2017)).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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government speech and thus allow rampant viewpoint discrimination. When
the government registers a trademark, it regulates private speech. It does not
speak for itself.”174 Because this was viewpoint discrimination, the court
determined that strict scrutiny applied, but had no need to go through the
analysis because the Government did not argue that the disparagement
provision of the Act would satisfy strict scrutiny.175
The Tam circuit judges proffered widely different opinions, however, on
the level of scrutiny, whether viewpoint discrimination was at issue, and
whether, even if it did exist, it was that sort of viewpoint discrimination that
was permissible. Judge Dyk, dissenting in part, argued that the trademark
registration process was a subsidy, where viewpoint neutrality is not necessary,
or at the very least that the Supreme Court has not declared it as such.176
Assuming arguendo it was, Dyk reasoned that the Act’s disparagement
provision was viewpoint-neutral because it looks “only to the views of the
referenced group” when determining whether it is disparaging.177 Judge
Lourie, dissenting, felt that the First Amendment should not be implicated at
all.178 Even if it were, the registration program and disparagement provision
were not viewpoint-discriminatory, similar to Dyk’s rationale.179
Finally, Judge Reyna, dissenting, argued that the regulation survived
intermediate scrutiny under a commercial speech analysis.180 Additionally,
he went so far as to suggest that the law is content-neutral because “an
apparently content-based law is nevertheless considered content-neutral if
the government’s purpose is not to suppress speech, but to address the
harmful secondary effects of that speech.”181 Reyna relied on the secondary
174

175

176
177

178
179

180

181

Id. at 1348. In the state university trademark context, the Eighth Circuit similarly found that denying
a trademark request with evidence of viewpoint-discriminatory motive was an impermissible
restriction on private speech, but in a limited public forum. See Gerlich v. Leath, 861 F.3d 697, 707
(8th Cir. 2017) (holding that university officials denying plaintiff’s request for a design with a cannabis
leaf was impermissible viewpoint discrimination). In Gerlich, the State did not even bring forth an
argument that the trademark program was narrowly tailored, suggesting that the Bar also struggles
with understanding the force and contours of viewpoint neutrality requirements. Id. at 705–07.
In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1328, 1355–56. But see id. at 1364 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“Ultimately, unlike the majority, I do not think that the government must support, or
society tolerate, disparaging trademarks in the name of commercial speech.”).
Id. at 1368 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1371. He also argued that viewpoint discrimination only applies to whether the government
disagrees with the view, not other individuals or groups. Id. at 1372. But see Bell v. City of Winter
Park, 745 F.3d 1318, 1324–25 (11th Cir. 2014) (invalidating an ordinance that allowed a person
residing in a dwelling unit to post “no loitering” signs, enforceable by city officers, because the
private citizens had discretion to enforce in a viewpoint-discriminatory manner).
In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1374 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1375–76 (“The government action does not include a judgment on the worthiness or the
effectiveness of the mark; if it did, it might—but not necessarily—venture into viewpointdiscrimination territory.”).
Id. at 1376 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (“[T]he refusal to register disparaging marks under § 2(a) of the
Lanham Act is an appropriate regulation that directly advances the government’s substantial
interest in the orderly flow of commerce.”).
Id. at 1378 (citation omitted). Judge Reyna’s syntactical attempt to categorize the seemingly
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effects doctrine to support this argument, and then turned to a sort of burdenbalancing test to justify the suppression (“of particularly low-value speech”)
at issue in the commercial context.182
In re Tam exemplifies the judicial discord in evaluating First Amendment
claims implicating questions of viewpoint discrimination. Federal judges at
the highest levels frequently disagree on what it really means to discriminate
based on ideology and viewpoint, whether the motive behind an action
requires the intent to suppress ideas, and when, if ever, such discrimination
may be appropriate. Given that the Federal Circuit left all of these questions
in contention—type of speech at issue, level of scrutiny, motives behind the
regulation, state interest—it was critical for the Supreme Court to provide
answers when it granted certiorari.183
B. Tam at the Supreme Court
As much as a clear, articulable rule or standard for evaluating viewpointbased regulations is desired, Matal v. Tam proved once again how critical
viewpoint neutrality may be, but how challenging it is to fix its boundaries
within our constitutional constellation. During oral arguments for Tam,
Justice Kagan flatly stated that the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act
was a “fairly classic case of viewpoint discrimination”184—but clarity on that
conclusion, as well as sound reasoning to be replicated was needed in the
Court’s opinion. Why was the rejection of Tam’s trademark so classically
viewpoint discrimination?
A majority of the Justices agreed that the PTO’s decision was indeed
viewpoint discrimination, but the consensus stopped there: Justice Alito
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court
with respect to certain parts of his opinion, with only Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Thomas and Breyer joining him for the entire opinion.185 Alito
began by noting that the PTO’s action offended a “bedrock” principle of the
First Amendment: “Speech may not be banned on the ground that it
expresses ideas that offend.”186 After briefly outlining the history of
trademarks and their protection at common law before such federal laws

182
183
184
185

186

content-based regulation as “content-neutral,” rather than argue that the content-based regulation
survives strict scrutiny, cuts at the core of the confusion in forum-shifting and speech-shifting.
Id. at 1379–81.
Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–13, Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (No. 15-1293).
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
All of the Justices who took part in the decision joined Part I, discussing facts and procedural history,
and Part III-A, holding that federally registered trademarks were private, not government speech.
All but Justice Thomas joined Part II of the opinion, rejecting Tam’s argument that Asians as a
group were not “persons” within the meaning of the Lanham Act. Then Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Thomas and Breyer joined Justice Alito in Parts III-B, III-V, and IV.
Id.
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were enacted, Alito emphasized that regardless of their commercial history,
trademarks extend “beyond phrases that do no more than identify a good or
service,” and frequently include “phrases that convey a message.”187
The Court unanimously agreed that federally registered trademarks are
private speech, rather than government speech.188 And given the Justices’
unanimity here, it is fair to presume the Court has no intention of extending
Walker and other government speech precedent. Indeed, the Court directly
distinguished registered trademarks from the specialty license plates at issue
in Walker as well as the public park monuments at issue in Summum.189 Further,
while Alito acknowledged the importance of the government speech doctrine
in order for the government to function by expressing certain views, he also
emphasized how it was a doctrine “susceptible to dangerous misuse.”190
Applying similar reasoning from his dissenting opinion in Walker, Alito wrote:
The Federal Government does not dream up these marks, and it does not
edit marks submitted for registration. . . .
In light of all this, it is far-fetched to suggest that the content of a registered
mark is government speech. If the federal registration of a trademark makes
the mark government speech, the Federal Government is babbling
prodigiously and incoherently. It is saying many unseemly things. It is
expressing contradictory views. It is unashamedly endorsing a vast array of
commercial products and services. And it is providing Delphic advice to the
consuming public.191

Thus, the Court made clear that federally registered trademarks were not an
area where viewpoint discrimination could be shielded by the government
speech doctrine.
Next, Alito rejected the Government’s argument that this was a case
involving government subsidies or government programs, an area where
viewpoint discrimination may be permissible.192 This conclusion, however,
was only joined by three other Justices. This part of the opinion also argued
(in dicta) that if this were a scenario in which the Government created a limited
public forum for private speech, viewpoint discrimination would still be

187
188
189

190
191
192

Id. at 1752.
Id. at 1760.
Id. at 1757–60; cf. supra notes 75, 100–102 and accompanying text (discussing government speech
doctrine in Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2253, and Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464
(2009)). All eight participating Justices joined in this section of the opinion—Parts III-A.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1758.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1760–61; see also supra Subpart II.B (discussing permissibility of viewpoint discrimination in
cases of government subsidies, including Rust and Finley). Alito distinguished precedents such as
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177–78 (1991), and Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569
(1998), primarily because they “all involved cash subsidies or their equivalent,” which was not at
issue in Tam. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1761.
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“forbidden.”193 And for three Justices joining Part III-B of Alito’s opinion, the
disparagement clause of the Lanham Act was clearly viewpoint discrimination:
Our cases use the term “viewpoint” discrimination in a broad sense, and
in that sense, the disparagement clause discriminates on the bases of
“viewpoint.” To be sure, the clause evenhandedly prohibits disparagement
of all groups. It applies equally to marks that damn Democrats and
Republicans, capitalists and socialists, and those arrayed on both sides of
every possible issue. It denies registration to any mark that is offensive to a
substantial percentage of the members of any group. But in the sense relevant
here, that is viewpoint discrimination: Giving offense is a viewpoint.194

Once viewpoint discrimination was evidenced, Alito looked next to what
level of scrutiny could apply to see if there would ever be a circumstance in
which the Lanham Act’s viewpoint-based disparagement clause could be
constitutionally viable. But instead of proffering a clear answer, Alito
concluded that the disparagement clause failed even intermediate scrutiny
applied to commercial speech under Central Hudson.195 Thus, to these four
Justices, the disparagement clause was not narrowly drawn to serve a
substantial government interest. An interest in promoting racial tolerance
was insufficient, running counter to the First Amendment’s protection of the
freedom to express “thought that we hate”—to quote Justice Holmes.196 And
the clause was not narrowly drawn to promote the government’s other
asserted interest—protecting the orderly flow of commerce by “driv[ing] out
trademarks that support invidious discrimination.”197 Alito’s opinion did not
provide a roadmap for lower courts to (i) clearly identify what viewpoint
discrimination is, and (ii) when and how to determine whether such
viewpoint discrimination is constitutionally permissible. Given a lack of any
language regarding viewpoint discrimination of private speech as per se
unconstitutional, courts may still infer that there are some undefined
scenarios in which it is permissible.
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor and Kagan, wavered more on whether viewpoint-based
regulations—such as the one at issue in Tam—could ever be constitutional.
Kennedy agreed with Justice Alito that the disparagement clause of the
Lanham Act constituted viewpoint discrimination, but argued that such a
determination “renders unnecessary any extended treatment of other
questions raised.”198 He first noted that viewpoint-based regulations are

193
194
195
196
197
198

Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763.
Id.
Id. at 1763–64 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 573 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
Id. at 1764 (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 1765.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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“presumptively unconstitutional,”199 and that the disparagement clause
exemplified viewpoint discrimination because the PTO may deny a
trademark that offends a person, institution, or national symbol, but not a
trademark that praises. Such a regulation “might silence dissent and distort
the marketplace of ideas.”200 Kennedy did not explicitly argue that viewpoint
discrimination was per se unconstitutional—just that it invokes some form of
heightened scrutiny. Only a few lines later, however, Kennedy wrote, “It is
telling that the Court’s precedents have recognized just one narrow situation
in which viewpoint discrimination is permissible: where the government itself
is speaking or recruiting others to communicate a message on its behalf.”201
By concluding that the disparagement clause is not government speech, for
Kennedy, that is enough to strike down the regulation.
Justice Thomas joined Justice Alito’s opinion in all parts except Part II—
analyzing and ultimately rejecting Tam’s statutory argument that Asians
were not “persons” within the meaning of the Lanham Act. Thomas chose
to emphasize in his two-paragraph-opinion that viewpoint-based regulations
should be subject to strict scrutiny, regardless of whether the speech
constitutes commercial or noncommercial speech.202
C. Contextualizing Tam
It is too early to say how the lower courts will interpret Tam, although
some decisions suggest it will narrow the circumstances by which a regulation
that squawks like viewpoint discrimination will be upheld.203 But there are
several points worth noting here. First, Alito’s Walker dissent effectively
triumphs in his Tam majority opinion, and very likely limited the expansion
of Walker into recognizing more mixed private-public speech as free from the
strictures of viewpoint neutrality. Second, the Court has yet to articulate
exactly what level of scrutiny should be applied to viewpoint-based

199
200
201
202
203

Id. at 1766 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995)).
Id.
Id. at 1768.
Id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found. Inc. v. Abbott, No. A-16-CA-00233-SS, 2017 WL 4582804,
at *5–7 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2017), appeal filed, No. 17-50956 (5th Cir. Oct. 27, 2017) (finding the
decision to take down plaintiff’s exhibit in a limited public forum either “for its satiric tone or for its
nontheistic point of view . . . constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination” and an
unconstitutional motive under Matal); Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 1:16-CV00932-JCC-IDD, 2017 WL 3158389, at *11–12 (E.D. Va. July 25, 2017), appeal filed sub nom., Davison
v. Randall, No. 17-2002 (4th Cir. Aug. 29, 2017) (banning plaintiff from participating in defendant
public official’s social media page because plaintiff’s views were unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination, even if the ban only lasted a few hours); cf. March v. Mills, 867 F.3d 46, 65–66 (1st
Cir. 2017) (invoking Matal to acknowledge that “when a restriction on speech is underinclusive, there
may be reason to doubt ‘whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather
than disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint,’” though finding the statute at issue had no
underinclusivity problem).
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regulations on commercial speech, since Justice Alito’s majority opinion simply
found the provision could not even withstand Central Hudson.204
Third, by Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, viewpoint-based regulations
might always be considered unconstitutional except in situations where the
government speaks for itself. Indeed, he concludes his Matal concurrence by
saying:
A law that can be directed against speech found offensive to some portion
of the public [is] . . . to the detriment of all. The First Amendment does not
entrust that power to the government’s benevolence. Instead, our reliance
must be on the substantial safeguards of free and open discussion in a
democratic society.205

This generalization seems to buck other accepted forms of viewpoint
discrimination outside of the government speech context, and avoids a clear
analysis of when viewpoint discrimination is permissible in those circumstances.
Finally, as the composition of the Supreme Court bench may shift in the coming
years—for example Justice Gorsuch’s past First Amendment jurisprudence
seems to align closely with Justice Scalia206—a more concrete structure towards
approaching viewpoint-based regulations of protected speech outside of the
government speech doctrine is possible, and needed.
Discord across the federal judiciary when facing viewpoint discrimination
claims suggest that the Court should expound further upon the general
inquiry of when a speech restriction constitutes viewpoint discrimination.
Further, every circumstance for which viewpoint discrimination is permissible
have yet to be discovered. A more effective, executable analysis of i) what is
viewpoint discrimination and ii) when (if ever) the Constitution permits it will
help guide federal courts through a questionably viewpoint-discriminatory,
but perhaps permissible regulation of speech. It also would help litigants who
do not put forth arguments for different levels of scrutiny or speech
characterizations.207 The Court could provide this through adjusting levels of
scrutiny for which Kagan’s Reed concurrence advocated; requiring a
204
205
206
207

See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Tejinder Singh, Judge Gorsuch’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 7, 2017, 11:16
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/judge-gorsuchs-first-amendment-jurisprudence/.
See, e.g., Gerlich v. Leath, 861 F.3d 697, 704–07 (8th Cir. 2017) (denying plaintiff’s request for a
design with a cannabis leaf was impermissible viewpoint discrimination); supra note 174 and
accompanying text.
It should also be noted that because the law is not clearly established—or at least it does not
appear to be clearly established—immunity defenses of state actors are significantly more likely to be
sustained against viewpoint discrimination challenges. See, e.g., Morgan v. Swanson, 755 F.3d 757,
761–62 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding a school principal had qualified immunity for prohibiting students
from distributing written religious materials at school because it was not clear she was violating clearly
established law). But see Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795, 802–03 (5th Cir. 2017) (denying a qualified
immunity defense because there was a dispute as to whether a councilman, who removed a citizen
from a parish council meeting, acted with improper motive—thereby amounting to viewpoint
discrimination; viewpoint neutrality was considered a clearly established First Amendment right).
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discriminatory motive analysis, as seen by several circuits;208 declaring that
viewpoint-based restrictions are per se invalid in any forum except for when
the government speaks, suggested by Tam; or another test yet to be seen.
CONCLUSION
While viewpoint discrimination is still highly disapproved, it is not
absolutely barred by the First Amendment. Indeed, the Court has permitted
viewpoint discrimination in several contexts, including schools, subsidies,
government speech, and left open the possibility it may be permissible in
other areas. It would be impossible to eradicate viewpoint discrimination
completely from state action, nor is that a goal espoused by any member of
the Court. However, clarity is needed to protect free speech and to monitor
potential suppression of ideas, both on the face of a statute targeting mixed
speech and also through discriminatory application of a viewpoint-neutral
statute. Only then will it be clear where viewpoint neutrality should be
concretely situated in First Amendment doctrine.

208

Some judges and circuit courts advocate for an intent or motive requirement for all viewpoint
discrimination claims. See, e.g., Gerlich, 861 F.3d at 705 (“Every viewpoint discrimination claim
‘requires, by its very nature, that the purposes or motives of governmental officials be determined.’”
(quoting Gay & Lesbian Student Ass’n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 367 (1988))); NAACP v. City of
Philadelphia, 834 F.3d 435, 449 n.7 (3rd Cir. 2016) (“Though some courts appear to say that motive
is not enough and that there must be evidence that the restriction is being implemented in a
discriminatory way . . . we have never so held. As such, we note that this remains an open question
in our Court.”); Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King Cty., 781 F.3d 489, 502 (9th Cir.
2015) (“Prevailing on this as-applied [viewpoint-discrimination] claim requires evidence that the
government intended to ‘suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s
view.’” (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)); Pahls v.
Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1230–31 (10th Cir. 2013) (comparing established Supreme Court doctrine
on viewpoint discrimination in the First Amendment context with the Tenth Circuit approach, which
requires a showing that the “defendant [state] acted with a viewpoint-discriminatory purpose”).
Plaintiffs argued in Jacobson v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec. in the Ninth Circuit that
viewpoint discrimination occurred under the guise of a viewpoint-neutral application of an
enforcement zone regulation, not because of the words of the policy itself, but because the state
action was “plainly motivated by the nature of [Plaintiffs’] message.” Plaintiff-Appellants’ Leesa
Jacobson et al.’s Opening Brief at 36, Jacobson v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 882 F.3d 878 (9th
Cir. 2018) (No. 16-17199) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit vacated and
remanded back to the district court to determine whether “the enforcement zone is a public forum,
and whether the government’s exclusion policy is permissible under the principles of forum
analysis.” 882 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2018). It will be interesting to see how the court rules in this
case, as the Ninth Circuit currently has decided in the government’s favor for content-based,
viewpoint-neutral regulations, more than any other circuit. See supra tbl.1.
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